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NOTHING BESIDES REMAINS:
PRESERVING THE SCIENTIFIC AND
CULTURAL VALUE OF PALEONTOLOGICAL
RESOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES
ALEXA Z. CHEW
INTRODUCTION
The badlands of Wyoming can be unforgiving—scorching heat
in the summer, sweeping blizzards in the winter, and only seven
inches of rainfall each year1 prevent most life from taking hold.
Although the door may be closed to all but the hardiest of organisms,
a window to a long-extinct world is wide open. The climate has made
life a struggle in this desert, but it has also preserved the fossils lying
beneath the rocky surface. Plant roots do not break them apart and
rain does not turn them into mush, as in moister climes. Intact, and
brimming with mystery, they tempt people to pick them up and take
them home.
Two men took them home by the ton in the late nineteenth
2
century. Othniel Charles Marsh and Edward Drinker Cope
competed for collection sites and sometimes smashed abandoned
specimens so that the other man’s crew could not collect them.3 Their
fossils were front page news, and a fascinated public pored over
accounts of the strange new creatures being found in the West. One
memorable illustration shows a Brontosaurus giganteus standing on
its hind legs, long neck outstretched, peering into the eleventh story

Copyright © 2005 by Alexa Z. Chew.
1. See BRS, INC., WYO. WATER DEV. COMM’N, WIND/BIGHORN RIVER BASIN PLAN:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2003) available at http://waterplan.state.wy.us/plan/bighorn/
execsumm.pdf (showing precipitation for the Bighorn Basin, Wyoming).
2. See W.J.T. MITCHELL, THE LAST DINOSAUR BOOK: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF A
CULTURAL ICON 29 (1998) (recounting the “fossil feud” between Othniel Charles Marsh and
Edward Drinker Cope).
3. Brent H. Breithaupt, Railroads, Blizzards, and Dinosaurs: A History of Collecting in the
Morrison Formation of Wyoming During the Nineteenth Century, 23 MOD. GEOLOGY 441, 455
(1998). Marsh also tried to destroy Cope’s reputation by circulating stories that he was insane.
MITCHELL, supra note 2, at 29.
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4
of the New York Life Building. Thirty years later, Barnum Brown, a
dinosaur hunter, excavated a “dinosaur graveyard” in Wyoming,
which would become the basis for a scene in the film Fantasia.5
After a half century’s lull, the last thirty years have seen a great
resurgence in the public’s interest in fossils, in part because of the
popularity of the film Jurassic Park,6 and also because new
controversies grabbed the public’s attention. In the 1970s, Professor
John Ostrom resurrected Professor T.H. Huxley’s defunct theory that
birds evolved from dinosaurs,7 setting off a fierce debate among
paleontologists. With the 1995 discovery of feathered dinosaurs in the
Liaoning region of China, this theory has proven prescient.8At about
the same time that Ostrom’s theory began to take hold in the
scientific community, Professors Luis and Walter Alvarez announced
that a giant meteorite crashed into the earth 65 million years ago and
9
killed the dinosaurs. This announcement provided a powerful image
that launched a thousand television specials.10
This revival has resulted in a considerable commercial market for
fossils, previously considered the province of museums and
universities. Collectors will pay premium prices to have a piece of
11
prehistory in their own homes. Anyone can buy a dinosaur fossil on
eBay, from a fragment for $5 to a skeleton for $2,000.12 A particularly
intact skeleton can fetch millions of dollars at auction houses like

4. See Breithaupt, supra note 3, at 458 (reproducing the front page of The New York
Journal and its headline, “MOST COLOSSAL ANIMAL EVER ON EARTH JUST FOUND
OUT WEST”).
5. MITCHELL, supra note 2, at 167.
6. Id. at 17.
7. See id. at 137 (noting the “schism” created by Huxley’s theory between the avian and
reptilian models of dinosaur paleontology); John H. Ostrom, Archaeopteryx and the Origin of
Flight, 49 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 35 (1974) (hypothesizing a “predatory theory of the origin of avian
flight” based on fossils of the dinosaur Archaeopteryx).
8. See, e.g., Carl C. Swisher III et al., Cretaceous Age for the Feathered Dinosaurs of
Liaoning, China, 400 NATURE 58 (1999) (describing fossils of feathered dinosaurs).
9. Luis W. Alvarez et al., Extraterrestrial Cause for the Cretaceous-Tertiary Extinction, 208
SCIENCE 1095 (1980). See generally WALTER ALVAREZ, T. REX AND THE CRATER OF DOOM
(1997) (describing, in narrative form, how Walter Alvarez developed the theory and found a
candidate impact crater in Mexico).
10. For one such example, see NOVA’s The Asteroid and the Dinosaur (PBS television
broadcast, Mar. 10, 1981).
11. See Christie Brown, A Dinosaur Named Sue, FORBES, Feb. 28, 1994, at 116 (“Last year
Bonhams auction house in London fetched $5,000 for 23 petrified dinosaur droppings, $7,700
for 33 bug-filled chunks of amber and $78,000 for a nest of 10 dinosaur eggs.”).
12. Editorial, Precious Bones, BOSTON GLOBE, June 29, 2003, at D10.
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13
Sotheby’s. This increase in demand for specimens concerns those
paleontologists who worry that scientifically valuable specimens are
being destroyed by clumsy collecting methods and that crucial
contextual information is being lost in the collectors’ hasty efforts to
extract the fossils.14 Other paleontologists worry that America’s
heritage is being sold to the highest bidder.15
The growing commercial market calls for a comprehensive
system to govern the collection and trade of fossils. However, the
choice of regulatory route depends on which aspect of a fossil is
valued most highly. There are at least three ways to assign value to a
fossil: economic, scientific, and cultural.16 Preserving one type of value
may limit or destroy the others. For example, digging up a fossil as
quickly as possible to rush it to market may maximize economic
value, but it can destroy scientific value.
For private collectors, the value of a fossil is inherent in the
object itself; its value is akin to that of a piece of art. That is, a fossil is
worth what the market is willing to pay, and the priority is to find,
collect, and prepare the best-looking and most complete specimens

13. Usha Lee McFarling, Ancient Bone Sales Thrive in Capitalist Era, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22,
2001, at A1.
14. See H.R. 2057 and H.R. 2416: Joint Hearing on H.R. 2416 Before the Subcomm. on
Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife and Oceans and the Subcomm. on Forests and Forest Health of
the House Comm. on Resources, 108th Cong. 47 (2003) (statement of Catherine A. Forster,
Ph.D., Member at Large, Society of Vertebrate Paleontology) [hereinafter Forster Testimony]
(explaining that the context in which fossils are found can “provide information about ancient
environments and climates, the age of the fossils, position in a historical sequence, . . . their
paleographic location[, and] ecological interactions and communities”); Illegal Trafficking of
Archaeological Resources; Protection of Paleontological Resources; and Designate Certain
Waterways in Puerto Rico: Hearing on S. 2727 Before the Subcomm. on National Parks of the
Senate Energy and Natural Resources Comm., 107th Cong. 15 (2002) (statement of Richard
Stucky, Ph.D., President, Society of Vertebrate Paleontology) (“A fossil collected without
[contextual] information has lost much of its value.”).
15. See JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
RIGHTS IN CULTURAL TREASURES 179–85 (1999) (discussing the American legal system’s
inability to protect paleontological resources as a part of the national heritage). Paleontology is
the study of past life forms, as represented by their fossils. This is distinct from archaeology,
which is the scientific study of past people and their culture through the examination and
analysis of their artifacts, such as potshards. PATRICK LEIGGI & PETER MAY, VERTEBRATE
PALEONTOLOGICAL TECHNIQUES 1–2 (1994).
16. These three classifications have been culled from types of value discussed by other
commentators. See Allison M. Dussias, Science, Sovereignty, and the Sacred Text:
Paleontological Resources and Native American Rights, 55 MD. L. REV. 84, 107 (1996)
(contrasting religious value and commercial value); Joseph L. Sax, Implementing the Public
Trust in Paleontological Resources, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 6TH FOSSIL RESOURCE
CONFERENCE 174 (Vincent L. Santucci & Lindsay McClelland eds., 2001) (discussing “materialobject value” and “scientific/educational value”).

110105 07_CHEW.DOC

1034

12/12/2005 3:16 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54:1031

possible. Like art, a fossil’s economic value is enhanced by a proper
17
provenance that shows a legal passage through the market.
For scientists, however, the value of a fossil is usually
18
contextual. Most paleontological research focuses not only on the
fossil itself, but also on the fossil’s location, the kind of rock it was
found in, the other organisms that were nearby, its position in the
historical sequence, its paleogeographic location, and how the fossil is
positioned relative to other fossils.19 This information helps
paleontologists put together the natural history of the organism from
which the fossil formed, such as its age and how the organism lived
and died, and also helps them to describe the climate and ecosystem
20
in which the organism lived. Fossil formation is a rare occurrence
because of the exceptional environmental conditions that it requires.21
More than 99 percent of the species that have lived are extinct and
22
can only be known by their fossilized remains, if at all. Without
contextual information, evidence of how extinct organisms lived is
lost.23 Knowledge of past ecosystems and climates is especially
important since global climate change, biodiversity, and ecosystem
24
health have become prominent public policy issues.
Finally, a fossil’s cultural value reflects its importance to the
larger community. The value of certain objects transcends market
value or scientific discovery to become part of collective knowledge
and experience. Such objects, including fossils, intuitively belong
25
within the public domain.

17. See, e.g., Paleo Direct Fossils, Fossils: Important Topics on Fossils and Primitive Human
Artifacts: Legality of Fossils for Sale and Collecting Fossils, at http://www.paleodirect.com/
fossils.htm (last visited June 18, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (describing the
importance of purchasing fossils from a trusted supplier to ensure that the fossils were legally
obtained); Colossal-Fossil-Site, The Paper Trail and Value (in Work), at http://www.colossalfossil-site.com/271-paperwork-value.htm (last visited June 18, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (describing the importance of keeping collection records); see also Anne Carlisle
Schmidt, The Confuciusornis Sanctus: An Examination of Chinese Cultural Property Law and
Policy in Action, 23 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 185, 187–90 (2000) (discussing the difficulties
that museums have when trying to exhibit fossils without provenances).
18. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
19. Forster Testimony, supra note 14, at 45, 47.
20. See, e.g., LEIGGI & MAY, supra note 15, at 47–53, 59–77.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See Sax, supra note 16, at 174 (“[N]o one should be permitted to privatize the
knowledge that collectively constitutes the field of paleontology. When government implements
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This Note argues that any successful comprehensive regulation of
fossil collection and trading must address these conflicting value
systems and resolve them within the existing private property
26
regime. Part I reviews the existing legal framework, including
statutes, regulations, and case law, that has failed to adequately
protect fossils. Part II reviews proposed legislation, including two
statutes that were never passed and one that is currently pending. In
Part III, this Note suggests a statute that would both maximize the
preservation of fossils’ scientific and cultural value and be
enforceable by borrowing elements from the existing legal
framework, the failed and pending legislation, and the scholarly
literature. To maximize the preservation of noneconomic value, a
statute must further four goals: (1) banning commercial collecting on
public land, (2) providing that all fossils found on federal land are
property of the United States, (3) deterring plundering, and (4)
maintaining accessibility for amateur collectors. To be enforceable,
the statute must promote uniformity, establish clear guidelines, limit
paperwork, and reward those who provide information about
violators.
I. THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK27
The United States has an exceptional approach to fossil
legislation—it draws a line between fossils found on public land and
those found on private land. Fossils found on private land belong to
the land’s owners, who may deal with them as they wish, including
selling or destroying them. Fossils found on public land, however, are
owned by the public and cannot pass into private ownership. Thus it
is legally impossible for a fossil found on public land to have
economic value, but perfectly legal for the owner of a fossil found on
private land to destroy its scientific value.

that principle by regulation governing excavation, use, and ownership of fossils . . . it acts
appropriately as a public trustee . . . .”).
26. Although arguing for a new American property regime is well outside the scope of this
Note, for a recent discussion of the topic, see generally LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA
OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER (2003).
27. This Note provides only a brief overview of the regulation of federal paleontological
resources. For a highly detailed explication of all the laws and regulations relating to fossil
preservation, see Robert W. Malmsheimer & Alisa S.H. Hilfinger, In Search of a
Paleontological Resources Policy for Federal Lands, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 587, 592–98 &
nn.31–83 (2003).
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No comprehensive federal law protects paleontological
resources, but fossils are protected in particular places and under
particular circumstances. In addition, the various public agencies that
manage federal lands where fossils are found regulate who can collect
fossils on their land, and violators may be prosecuted for theft of
government property. However, as the caselaw demonstrates,
prosecution is difficult, and the penalties are insufficient to deter
poachers.
A. Statutory Authority
Although
no
federal
legislation
specifically
targets
28
paleontological resources on public lands, at least eight statutes
regulate them, although the statutes themselves are directed at other
targets.29 The most inclusive statute is the Antiquities Act of 1906,
which prohibits the appropriation, excavation, injury, or destruction
of “any historic or prehistoric ruin or monument, or any object of
antiquity” that is located on federal land “without the permission of
the Secretary of the Department of the Government having
jurisdiction over the lands on which said antiquities are situated.”30
The Antiquities Act does not define “object[s] of antiquity,” and it
has been used to permit specific paleontological excavations under a
section that authorizes the president to establish national
monuments.31 In 1974, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the Antiquities Act was “fatally vague” because it employed
32
“undefined terms of uncommon usage,” and so violated the Due
Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. However, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the Antiquities Act’s constitutionality in
28. Id. at 592.
29. A comprehensive list of statutes, regulations and policies that federal agencies use to
manage fossils may be found in: BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
COLLECTION, STORAGE, PRESERVATION AND SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF FOSSILS FROM FEDERAL
AND INDIAN LANDS app. 1, at 9–15 (May 1999), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/geology/
fedfos.pdf.
30. Antiquities Act of 1906 § 1, 16 U.S.C. § 433 (2000). Violators may be subject to a fine of
up to five hundred dollars, imprisonment for a maximum period of ninety days, or both. Id.
31. Id. § 2, 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2000). See, e.g., Dinosaur National Monument, Proclamation
No. 131, 39 Stat. 1752 (Oct. 4, 1915); Petrified Forest National Monument, Proclamation No.
697, 34 Stat. 3266 (Dec. 8, 1906).
32. United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113, 115 (9th Cir. 1974). Appellant was prosecuted for
appropriating Indian face masks that were made in 1969 or 1970, but were considered “objects
of antiquity” because they related to long-standing religious or social traditions. Id. at 114. The
court held that the Antiquities Act gave no notice that “antiquity” could have this definition.
Id. at 115.
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33
1979. The Antiquities Act’s successor, the Archeological Resources
Protection Act of 1979 (ARPA),34 protects archaeological resources
on public lands and Indian lands because they are an “accessible and
35
irreplaceable part of the Nation’s heritage.” ARPA was adopted to
protect artifacts, which had become increasingly endangered as their
commercial value rose.36 ARPA specifically excludes paleontological
specimens from its protection unless they are found in an
37
archaeological context.
Several planning statutes also address paleontological resources.
The National Park Service (NPS) is required to conserve natural and
historic objects in the National Park System, and the agency has
38
broad authority to promulgate regulations to advance this goal. For
39
example, the NPS must address paleontological resources in its
conservation and management plans for parks covered by the Alaska
40
National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980. Information
concerning the nature and specific location of paleontological
resources in parks may be withheld from disclosure under the
Freedom of Information Act.41 Fossils that are found in significant
caves are protected,42 as are those found in the Hells Canyon National
Recreation Area.43
Finally, the fact that the unauthorized conversion of anything of
value belonging to the United States is a criminal act serves as a
catchall for any fossils that are not protected by other means.44

B. Regulatory Authority
Regulations governing paleontological resources fall into two
major categories: protection and prohibition. The NPS, the Forest
Service, and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) are the
primary agencies promulgating regulations. The NPS prohibits
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

United States v. Smyer, 596 F.2d 939, 940–41 (10th Cir. 1979).
16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa–mm (2000).
Id. § 470aa(a)(1).
Id. § 470aa(a)(2)–(3).
Id. § 470bb(1).
National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
Id. § 3191(b).
Id. § 3101–3233.
Id. § 5937.
Id. § 4306.
Id. § 460gg–7(b).
18 U.S.C. § 641 (2000).
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anyone from possessing, injuring, or disturbing paleontological
45
specimens. It also has the power to designate National Natural
Landmarks, which are “outstanding example[s] of major biological
46
and geological features” within the United States, including fossils.
The Forest Service requires special-use authorization for the
excavation, damage, or removal of any paleontological resource for
47
commercial purposes, and the agency prohibits people from entering
any area that is closed for the protection of a paleontological
interest.48 The BLM allows the collection of reasonable amounts of
common invertebrate fossils and petrified wood for noncommercial
49
purposes, but it prohibits the willful disturbance of any scientific or
cultural resource without authorization.50 Violations of BLM
regulations are Class A misdemeanors, punishable by a maximum of
one year in prison, a one hundred thousand dollar fine, or both.51
Violating a Forest Service regulation is a Class B misdemeanor,
punishable by up to six months’ imprisonment, a five thousand dollar
fine, or both.52
C. Case Law
There is very little case law regarding fossil disputes, and to date,
53
only one fossil prosecution has been based on the Antiquities Act.
The case of Sue the Tyrannosaurus rex was a failed attempt to
prosecute under the Antiquities Act, and it highlights everything
wrong with American fossil law. In August 1990, a commercial fossil
collector, Peter Larson, and an amateur collector, Sue Hendrickson,

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

36 C.F.R. § 2.1 (2004).
Id. § 62.2.
Id. § 261.9(i).
Id. § 261.53(c).
43 C.F.R. § 8365.1–5(b)(2) to (3) (2003).
Id. § 8365.1–5(a)(1); see also U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR ET AL., ASSESSMENT OF
FOSSIL MANAGEMENT ON FEDERAL & INDIAN LANDS 20 tbl.2 (May 2000) (summarizing the
requirements for obtaining a scientific collecting permit), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/
geology/fossil.pdf.
51. Parks and Memorial Bills: Hearing on S. 546 Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Parks of the
Senate Energy and Natural Res. Comm., 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Elizabeth Estill,
Deputy Chief for Programs Legislation and Communications, Forest Service, U.S. Department
of Agriculture) [hereinafter Estill Testimony].
52. Id.
53. See Malmsheimer & Hilfinger, supra note 27, at 597–98 (“This unreported case
involved a Harvard professor who was arrested and charged under the Antiquities Act with
collecting fossils on BLM land.”).
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happened upon a T. rex skeleton in the Black Hills of South Dakota.
Larson was the president and owner of the Black Hills Institute of
Geological Research (Institute), in Hill City, South Dakota, which
55
focused on collecting, preparing, and marketing fossils. The skeleton
was found on a ranch belonging to Maurice Williams, a Native
American living on the Cheyenne River Sioux Indian Reservation.56
Williams sold the Institute the rights to excavate the site for five
57
thousand dollars.
Larson and the Institute unearthed the fossil in a speedy
seventeen days, and it proved to be the largest and most complete T.
58
rex skeleton excavated to that date. The Institute spent two years
59
preparing the specimen, which had been nicknamed “Sue” after its
discoverer. Larson invited paleontologists to study Sue and publicly
announced that she would never be sold; instead, he would showcase
her remains in a new natural history museum in Hill City.60
Two months after Larson’s March 1992 announcement,
government agents raided the Institute and seized the ten-ton fossil,
storing it in a metal container inside a machine shop at the South
61
Dakota School of Mines and Technology (School of Mines). The
United States Attorney for South Dakota had ordered the raid, based
62
on a violation of the Antiquities Act. Maurice Williams’ ranch was
part of the Reservation, and as such it was held in trust for him by the
63
United States. This unusual property arrangement placed the land
under the purview of the Antiquities Act—at least to a degree.
Maurice Williams, the Cheyenne River Sioux tribe, and the
Institute all claimed ownership over the valuable specimen. The trust

54. Alison Frankel, Tyrannosaurus Lex, AM. LAW., Dec. 1992, at 45.
55. United States v. Larson, 110 F.3d 620, 623 (8th Cir. 1997) (Black Hills VI).
56. Black Hills Inst. of Geological Research v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 967 F.2d
1237, 1238–39 (8th Cir. 1992) (Black Hills I).
57. Black Hills V, 88 F.3d at 615.
58. Black Hills I, 967 F.2d at 1239.
59. See id. at 1238 (noting that the Institute held the fossil from August 1990 until its
seizure in May 1992); Frankel, supra note 54, at 45.
60. See id. at 1239 (“The Institute moved the fossil to Hill City, South Dakota, for public
display and research.”).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Black Hills Inst. of Geological Research v. United States, 812 F. Supp. 1015, 1016–17
(D.S.D. 1993). The laws regarding Native American trust land are somewhat complex. For a
deeper discussion of the laws’ implications in the Black Hills cases, see Dussias, supra note 16,
at 86–96.
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patent deed to Williams’ property included a restriction against
alienation, which expired four years after he accepted payment from
64
Larson. Williams could not remove the restriction or convey an
“interest in the land” without approval from the Secretary of the
65
Interior. He failed to apply for or receive such approval, which
should have voided Williams’ sale of the excavation rights to the
66
Institute. However, the Institute argued that Sue was not an
“interest in land” because, once severed (extracted), she had become
personal property, which was not subject to the restriction.67 The
court disagreed as to both the nature and ownership of the property:
it held that the extraction did not transform “land” into “property”
and did not sever the fossil from Williams’ trust.68 The “salient point is
that the fossil had for millions of years been an ‘ingredient’ of the
earth that the United States holds in trust for Williams.”69 Sue had
become integrated into the land, and she was thus subject to the laws
70
governing Indian trust land. Williams could not and did not transfer
71
title to Larson. The dinosaur still belonged to him as much as Indian
trust land ever belonged to him. The federal government arranged for
the fossil to be auctioned by Sotheby’s, with the proceeds going to
Williams. The Field Museum in Chicago and several corporate

64. Black Hills Inst. of Geological Research, 812 F. Supp. at 1020.
65. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 483 (2000)).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1021 n.6.
68. Id. at 1021.
69. Black Hills Inst. of Geological Research v. S.D. Sch. of Mines & Tech., 12 F.3d 737, 742
(8th Cir. 1993) (Black Hills III) (explaining that so long as Sue was land held in trust under the
relevant statutes, the attempted transfer of interest was void and the trust continued in the Sue
fossil when it became personal property); see also United States v. Brown, 8 F.2d 564, 566 (8th
Cir. 1925) (“[N]o change of form of property [of Indian trust land] divests it of a trust.”).
70. See 25 U.S.C. § 348 (“[I]f any conveyance shall be made of the lands set apart and
allotted as herein provided, or any contract made touching the same, before the expiration of
the time [specified], such conveyance or contract shall be absolutely null and void . . . .”); id.
§ 461 (“[N]o land of any Indian reservation, created or set apart by treaty or agreement with the
Indians, Act of Congress, Executive order, purchase, or otherwise, shall be allotted in severalty
to any Indian.”).
71. Having lost any claim to ownership or possession, the Institute asserted a $209,000 lien
against the fossil for the work it performed in excavating and preparing Sue. Black Hills Inst. of
Geological Research v. Williams, 88 F.3d 614, 615 (8th Cir. 1996) (Black Hills V). The claim was
denied. Id. The court commented that the Institute was on notice that the federal government
had a possible interest in the fossil because it was found within the boundaries of the
reservation, and that the Institute had failed to diligently investigate whether Sue could be
removed without government approval. Id. at 616. As a result, the Institute could not be
considered a good-faith, bona fide purchaser. Id.
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backers, including The Walt Disney Company and McDonald’s
72
Corporation, won the auction with a bid of $8.36 million.
Meanwhile, the government obtained a thirty-nine-count
indictment against Larson, alleging a variety of crimes, none of which
73
included the Antiquities Act; he was ultimately convicted of theft of
74
United States’ property, retention of stolen United States’
75
property, failure to file a customs report when exporting monetary
instruments,76 and failure to file a customs report when importing
77
monetary instruments. Amazingly, none of these offenses involved
the T. rex; Larson was convicted of a series of minor crimes unrelated
to Sue, stemming instead from other fossil-collecting expeditions.78
“Sue [was] nowhere to be found within the four corners of the . . .
79
criminal prosecution.”
Larson was sentenced to two years’ confinement, two years’
80
supervised release, a $5,000 fine, and a special assessment of $150.
Judge Beam, dissenting in relevant part, stated that Larson’s sentence
was too harsh “given the minimal and uncertain nature of the
offenses, especially the theft offenses involving property of less than
$100 in value.”81 She viewed the criminal prosecution as federal
participation in “an earlier and ongoing argument between and

72. The fossil is now on display at the Field Museum, and casts are owned by The Walt
Disney Corporation and McDonald’s Corporation. SAX, supra note 15, at 181.
73. United States v. Larson, 110 F.3d 620, 623 (8th Cir. 1997) (Black Hills VII).
74. Id. at 622 (violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2000)). Along with Sue’s remains, the
government seized fossils that were taken from the Gallatin National Forest in Montana and the
Buffalo Gap National Grasslands in South Dakota, which are lands belonging to the United
States, and from which Larson did not have authority to remove fossils. Id. at 623.
75. Id. at 622 (second violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641). Larson removed and kept invertebrate
fossils from Forest Service land for commercial purposes. Id. at 624.
76. Id. at 622 (violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1)(A) (2000)). Larson carried more than ten
thousand dollars with him to Peru, where he excavated and exported baleen whale fossils,
without filing the appropriate customs form. Id. at 623.
77. Id. at 622 (second violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1)(A)). Larson purchased more than
ten thousand dollars in traveler’s checks while on a business trip to Japan and again failed to
complete the appropriate customs form. Id. at 623.
78. Id. at 623; see supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text. Larson argued that the
invertebrate fossils that he had removed from a national forest were legally collected under the
Forest Service’s 1986 regulation allowing noncommercial harvesting of invertebrate fossils.
Black Hills VI, 110 F.3d at 624 (citing 51 Fed. Reg. 30,355, 30,355–56, codified at 36 C.F.R. §
261.9(i) (2004)). The court rejected this argument because a rational trier of fact could have
found beyond a reasonable doubt that he removed the fossils for commercial purposes. Id.
79. Id. at 629 (Beam, J., concurring and dissenting).
80. Id. at 623.
81. Id. at 630 (Beam, J., concurring and dissenting).
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among public, academic, and commercial collectors and curators
82
vying for control of archaeological remains worldwide.” This
categorization was probably quite accurate, and during the Black
Hills litigation, several legislative alternatives were proposed to
clarify the federal laws on fossil collecting and thus prevent such
shaky prosecutions in the future.
II. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES TO THE EXISTING
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Two competing pieces of legislation were introduced in the wake
of the Black Hills litigation. One, the Vertebrate Paleontological
Resources Protection Act (VPRPA),83 sought to protect fossils’
cultural and scientific value. The other, the Fossil Preservation Act
(FPA),84 primarily sought to protect fossils’ economic value. Both bills
failed to pass. In 2002, the umbrella legislation concept was revived in
85
the Paleontological Resources Preservation Act (PRPA), which
focuses on fossils’ cultural and scientific value. PRPA passed in the
86
Senate and is under consideration by the House of Representatives.
A. Scholarly Views on an Ideal Statute
Many commentators agree that the existing legal patchwork is
inadequate,87 but they disagree as to what should be done about it.
One pair of scholars has focused on the unfairness of the current
88
system and its singling out of commercial collectors for punishment.
82. Id. at 628 (Beam, J., concurring and dissenting).
83. S. 3107, 102d Cong. (1992).
84. H.R. 2943, 104th Cong. § 2(b)(1)–(2) (1996).
85. S. 263, 109th Cong. (2005).
86. S. 263, 109th Cong. (as passed by Senate, July, 26, 2005).
87. See Malmsheimer & Hilfinger, supra note 27, at 613 (“Congress needs to exercise this
power rather than delegating its authority to federal agencies without guidance.”); David J.
Lazerwitz, Note, Bones of Contention: The Regulation of Paleontological Resources on the
Federal Public Lands, 69 IND. L.J. 601, 623 (1994) (arguing that the fossil collector and the land
manager need a clear picture of paleontological resource policy, which can be achieved through
uniformity); Gretchen Lundgren, Comment, Protecting Federal Fossils from Extinction, 26 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 225, 227 (1998) (“[T]here is a need for a single comprehensive and
coherent federal policy for managing and protecting fossils on public lands.”); cf. Schmidt, supra
note 17, at 212–15 (describing the difficulty of enforcing China’s patchwork paleontology law).
88. See Patrick K. Duffy & Lois A. Lofgren, Jurassic Farce: A Critical Analysis of the
Government’s Seizure of “Sue™,” a Sixty-Five-Million-Year-Old Tyrannosaurus rex Fossil, 39
S.D. L. REV. 478, 481 (1994) (“[R]ecent [regulatory] efforts to ‘regulate’ paleontologists have
been by search warrant and a good deal more heavy-handed than the treatment accorded their
archaeological brethren.”).
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Other writers have suggested elements that might be incorporated
into an ideal fossil protection statute, with most focusing on
89
enhancing clarity or enforceability. Still other scholars have
90
proposed complete overhauls of the ideological groundwork.
Proposals for improving legal clarity include creating a law that
explicitly protects fossils, rather than extending archaeology or
91
cultural relic laws to cover paleontology, and defining terms
92
broadly but clearly, to avoid confusion and multiple interpretations.93
An ideal law would intervene before damage is done to the
fossils and the dig site, rather than pursuing the bad guys after the site
has been looted.94 One author suggests that a preventative scheme
may be more productive than a punishment-based system.95
Prevention may require non-legal responses, such as sealing off
valuable collecting areas and increasing public awareness of fossils’
non-economic values.96 Ranking fossil sites based on the symbolic,
historic, or scientific value of the fossils, or their rarity, could focus
97
resources on the sites that are most deserving of protection.
Penalties could deter theft, and a national policy could provide
agencies with prosecution guidance.98 A central agency could be
designated to control paleontological resource issues by assisting
federal land managers, saving the rest of the agencies from
“rediscover[ing] . . . the wheel.”99 Regulating only fossils on federal
land is probably insufficient, however, without a certification-of100
origin requirement.
89. See infra notes 91–105 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 106–14 and accompanying text.
91. Schmidt, supra note 17, at 210–11.
92. A narrow definition of protected fossils, as the example of China shows, will not suffice
to protect specimens. Cf. Lundgren, supra note 87, at 260.
93. Id.
94. Schmidt, supra note 17, at 213.
95. Id. at 215.
96. Id. at 218–20; see also Lundgren, supra note 87, at 259 (“Agencies often avoid the delay
and conflict accompanying promulgating regulations due to the diverse interests of various
groups by promulgating rules internally. . . . [T]he lack of public participation and knowledge of
the rules[, however,] serves only to impede the protection of fossils because collectors may be
unaware that such rules exist.”).
97. See Schmidt, supra note 17, at 204–06 (describing the Chinese system of
administratively grading cultural relics and sites and the concomitant protections applied, but
noting potential problems stemming from the subjectivity of the grading process).
98. Lundgren, supra note 87, at 262.
99. Lazerwitz, supra note 87, at 634.
100. Sax, supra note 16, at 176.
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The permitting process could be made more effective and
efficient by focusing on amateur collectors, in addition to
paleontologists, who bear an “onerous burden” of obtaining a permit
even though they engage in activities that may be less damaging than
101
those of amateurs. One commentator offers three reasons why
comprehensive legislation should include amateur permits.102 First,
permits will allow agencies to “adapt to the varying levels of
103
protection fossils require.” Second, land management agencies will
be able to track the number of collectors.104 Third, requiring permits
for all collectors will eliminate ambiguity about who may collect
105
fossils.
Professor Joseph L. Sax argues that the United States should
recognize fossils as “elements of the national patrimony,” as other
countries do, and as such should be protected on both public and
106
private land: “[N]o one should be permitted to privatize the
knowledge that collectively constitutes the field of paleontology.”107
He suggests several practical approaches to this problem. For
example, in France, the state holds the right to control all future
excavation of antiquities, thereby providing “a barrier against both
destructive or mutilative behavior by landowners and against
extortionate economic demands, and permit[ing] to government
researchers a right of temporary occupation for purposes of study and
preservation.”108 The state would compensate the owners of excavated
land for actual losses to current use or development value, but not for
109
historic or scientific values. Sax also advocates for an established
scheme by which the government can identify which fossils should be
110
“regulated or acquired.” He suggests distinguishing between the
object and the ideas that are embedded within the object, and

101. Lazerwitz, supra note 87, at 623–24.
102. Lundgren, supra note 87, at 260.
103. Id. at 260–61.
104. Id. at 261.
105. Id.
106. SAX, supra note 15, at 184. Sax does not see any constitutional barriers to extending
protection to private lands. See Sax, supra note 16, at 176 (reasoning that such regulation would
neither be ultra vires with respect to the Commerce Clause nor transgressive of the Takings
Clause).
107. Sax, supra note 16, at 174.
108. SAX, supra note 15, at 193.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 194.
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111
regulating fossils to the extent required to preserve the ideas. The
object would be treated as an ordinary object on public lands would
be treated, whereas the ideas—and whatever portion of the object is
needed to preserve them—would be safeguarded as “inalienable
element[s] of the public domain.”112 This would be similar to the
English treatment of treasure trove, in which items that are not
113
required for public institutions are returned to the finder. Another
way to encourage private owners of significant fossils to share their
scientific value with the public would be to have them register the
fossils; in exchange for making them available to researchers and the
public, the owners would receive a tax benefit such as a charitable
deduction or partial exemption from the estate tax.114
Other commentators express concern about the role that Native
American tribes should play in the regulation of paleontological
resources found on reservation lands, although these concerns come
from opposite theoretical directions—preservation of Native
American culture versus the preservation of Native Americans’ right
to profit from the fossils. Professor Allison Dussias places scientific
and economic values at one end of the spectrum, and religious (or
cultural) value at the other.115 According to Professor Dussias, Native
116
Americans consider fossils a part of their “sacred text,” viewing
them as objects integral to a living religion.117 From this perspective,
scientists and commercial collectors pose indistinguishable threats to
fossils; whether used to advance human knowledge or hung above the
mantle like a swordfish, fossils removed from the earth offend Native
American traditions.118 Two other authors, however, emphasize that if
fossil legislation must be passed, an action that they do not advocate,
it should distinguish public land from Indian trust land, as ARPA

111. Id. at 195.
112. Sax, supra note 16, at 174.
113. SAX, supra note 15, at 196.
114. Sax, supra note 16, at 175. Another proposal would “compensate commercial collectors
for their time and expense for excavating and for preparing scientifically significant specimens.”
Dorna Sachiko Sakurai, Comment, Animal, Mineral, or Cultural Antiquity?: The Management
and Protection of Paleontological Resources, 17 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 197, 217 (1994).
115. Dussias, supra note 16, at 107.
116. Id. at 153.
117. Id. at 154–55; see id. at 107–08 (“[T]he use of fossils in healing practices demonstrates
their religious significance.”).
118. Dussias does not recognize the distinction between scientifically minded
paleontologists and commercial collectors, which is perhaps the result of her strong commitment
to the cultural value of fossils. See id. at 156 (referring to the Institute staff as paleontologists).
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119

does. These authors consider it essential that Native Americans not
be deprived of a potential economic resource, noting that some fossils
“have great monetary value and might be viewed as a financial asset
120
similar to mining, hunting, and fishing rights.” Professor Sax has
weighed in on this dialogue, charging the government with finding a
way “to accommodate the two distinctive trust-type obligations the
United States bears, to tribal autonomy and to our common
evolutionary heritage.”121
B. Failed Legislation
Two pieces of legislation introduced in the 1990s took opposite
approaches to creating comprehensive fossil legislation. One, the
VPRPA, found favor with scientists who approved of its focus on
scientific method. The other, the FPA, was endorsed by commercial
collectors, who would have been permitted to collect and profit from
fossils found on federal lands.
1. The Vertebrate Paleontological Resources Protection Act.
The VPRPA was introduced to the 102d Congress by Senator Max
Baucus.122 Although the legislative history does not refer directly to
123
Sue, the bill was introduced on July 30, 1992, ten weeks after the
government’s raid on the Institute. Baucus cited the rising
commercial pressure to exploit fossils, fueled by their recent rise in
popularity, as a compelling reason for comprehensive protection.124
VPRPA would have attempted to smooth over the apparent conflict
between the scientific community and amateur collectors by
describing the latter as a vital part of the former,125 and noting that
amateurs’ previous contributions had advanced American
paleontology.126 VPRPA would have encouraged amateur collecting

119. See Duffy & Lofgren, supra note 88, at 496 (stating that ARPA included this distinction
after protest by Native Americans and encouraging similar action in the future).
120. Id. at 497–98 (quoting Thomas H. Boyd, Disputes Regarding the Possession of Native
American Religious and Cultural Objects and Human Remains: A Discussion of the Applicable
Law and Proposed Legislation, 55 MO. L. REV. 883, 891–92 (1990)). Patrick Duffy was counsel
to the Institute, which arguably informed his opinion. Id. at 478 n.†.
121. Sax, supra note 16, at 176.
122. S. 3107, 102d Cong. (1992).
123. Id.
124. 138 CONG. REC. 20,489 (1992) (statement of Sen. Baucus).
125. S. 3107 § 2(4).
126. Id. § 2(5)–(6).
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127
by allowing amateurs to apply for permits and retain the fossils that
they found unless they were of “significant scientific value.”128 This
would have expanded agencies’ practice, which mainly involves
129
issuing permits for large-scale fossil excavations. The fossils would
have remained the property of the United States, however; amateurs
would have been prevented from selling them,130 and only those
amateurs affiliated with a suitable institution would have been issued
131
permits.
The permitting process would have filtered and distinguished
those individuals who were truly amateur paleontologists from those
who were treasure hunters by using a purpose test; collecting for
132
commercial purposes would have been strictly prohibited. In
addition, any trade in illegally obtained fossils would have been
prohibited.133 A knowing violation would have resulted in a maximum
fine of ten thousand dollars, imprisonment for up to one year, or
134
both, with the maximum fine and prison sentence doubled if the
fossil value exceeded five hundred dollars.135 Subsequent offenses
would have resulted in a maximum fine of one hundred thousand
136
dollars, imprisonment of up to five years, or both. Civil penalties
were to be determined by subsequent administrative regulations.137

127. See id. § 6(b)(1) (requiring that an applicant be qualified to carry out the activity, but
not specifying any formal training or a degree in paleontology).
128. Id. § 7(b)(1). Amateur collectors would have to report discoveries of a paleontological
resource to the federal land manager, who would determine whether the resource has
“significant scientific value.” Id. The federal land manager could consult with a paleontologist
qualified to assess the resource in making this determination. Id. § 7(b)(2).
129. Lazerwitz, supra note 87, at 628.
130. S. 3107 §7(b)(3). This arrangement is identical to one in use by scientific collectors
now—the appropriate repository retains possession of the fossil, but the fossil remains the
property of the United States and cannot be alienated. U.S. DEP’T. OF THE INTERIOR ET AL.,
supra note 50, at 21.
131. S. 3107 § 4(1). An amateur collector is an individual who “collects paleontological
resources for personal enjoyment, recreation, and educational purposes” and “is affiliated with
a suitable institution for the purpose of collecting paleontological resources.” Id.
132. Id. § 8(a).
133. Id. § 8(b)–(c).
134. Id. § 8(d)(1)(A).
135. Id. § 8(d)(B). Value is determined by either the commercial or paleontological value of
the resource plus the cost of recovery, restoration, and repair. Id.
136. Id. § 8(d)(2).
137. Id. § 9(a)(2).
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2. The Fossil Preservation Act of 1996.
The FPA was
introduced in the House of Representatives by Representatives Tim
Johnson and Joe Skeen with the stated purposes of securing fossils on
public lands for the present and future benefit of Americans and
138
providing a uniform national policy on fossil collecting. The FPA
advanced these purposes by proposing to open public lands to
commercial collecting, thereby reducing the “loss of fossils resulting
from erosion and theft” and encouraging the study of “scientifically
unique paleontological specimens.”139 Paleontology would be “best
served by unimpeded access to fossils and fossil-bearing rocks in the
140
field.”
The FPA would have created a new type of permit, the
141
commercial collecting permit. This permit would have allowed
fossils collected from federal lands to be sold, with fees and royalties
142
payable to the federal government. Commercial collectors would
have been required to maintain paleontological records, to deposit
them with the United States Geological Survey, and to report any
unanticipated discoveries to the agency granting the permit.143 The
National Fossil Council (Council), a creation of the FPA, would have
determined which fossils were scientifically unique.144 Fossils would
have been presumed not to be scientifically unique; approval by five
of the seven Council members would have been required to rebut the
presumption.145
The FPA did not assign criminal penalties for violations, but
federal land managers could have assessed civil penalties of up to one
hundred thousand dollars for willful violation of any provision.146
Because it intended to permit commercial collection and private
enrichment from public property, the FPA was lambasted in the press
as extremist legislation that would subject public land to commercial

138. H.R. 2943, 104th Cong. § 2(b)(1)–(2) (1996).
139. Id. § 2(b)(3)–(4).
140. Id. § 2(a)(2).
141. Id. § 5(d). The FPA would have continued to authorize the issuance of educational
collecting permits and scientific collecting permits. Id. § 5(b)–(c).
142. Id. §§ 5(d)(1)(A)–(B), 6.
143. Id. § 5(d)(1)(C)–(D).
144. Id. §§ 9(b)(1), 5(d)(1)(D).
145. See id. § 9(f)(2) (“Designating a fossil as scientifically unique in connection with a
commercial permit requires an affirmative vote of five members of the Council.” (emphasis
added)).
146. Id. § 8(a).
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147
fossil plundering. The president of the Society of Vertebrate
Paleontology criticized the FPA because the rules equated
importance with size and rarity and because commercial collectors
were unlikely to record small, but crucial, details in their quests to
collect spectacular finds.148

C. Currently Proposed Legislation: Paleontological Resources
Preservation Act
PRPA would add little to the procedural system that federal
agencies currently employ to regulate collection of paleontological
resources; it would merely streamline the existing jumble by
149
instituting uniform criminal and civil penalties for violations. The
PRPA would make prosecuting violators easier and more successful;
prosecutors are reluctant to try fossil theft cases under the current
regime because they are so difficult to win.150
PRPA is a response to the 2000 report, “Assessment of Fossil
151
which was
Management on Federal and Indian Lands,”
commissioned by Congress following a Senate Report.152 Seven
federal agencies and the Smithsonian Institution prepared the 2000

147. See Chris Beard, Editorial, Save the Dinosaurs, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 28,
1996, at A11 (“All parents with children who are fascinated by dinosaurs need to understand
that powerful elements in Congress aim to drive a stake through the heart of their child’s early
enthusiasm for science in the form of dinosaurs.”).
148. Philip Cohen, U.S. Bill Could Give Fossil Hunters a Field Day, NEW SCIENTIST,
Mar. 16, 1996, at 1010.
149. See 149 CONG. REC. S3266 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 2003) (statement of Sen. Akaka) (“The
protections offered in this Act are not new. Federal land management agencies have individual
regulations prohibiting theft of government property.”); see also H.R. 2057 and H.R. 2416: Joint
Hearing on H.R. 2416 Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife and Oceans and
the Subcomm. on Forests and Forest Health of the House Comm. on Resources, 108th Cong. 36
(2003) (statement of Rep. James P. McGovern) (“It is important to note that the bill seeks only
to penalize those who seek to profit illegally from these public resources. It does not place any
new restrictions on amateur collectors, who by and large respect the value of these fossils.”).
150. 149 CONG. REC. S3266 (statement of Sen. Akaka).
151. U.S. DEP’T. OF THE INTERIOR ET AL., supra note 50.
152. 149 CONG. REC. S3266 (statement of Sen. Akaka). PRPA was first introduced in 2002,
when it had bipartisan support, but it was still awaiting committee approval at the close of the
107th Congress. Id. The Act was approved by unanimous consent in the Senate during the 107th
Congress. 149 CONG. REC. S3265 (2003). PRPA was reintroduced in the 108th Congress by
Senator Daniel Akaka as S. 546 and by Representative James McGovern as H.R. 2416.
Valentina Petrova, McGovern Leads the Effort to Protect Treasured Fossils, WORCESTER
TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, June 23, 2003, at A1. The two bills were similar in content, but neither
was approved at the close of the 108th Congress. PRPA was reintroduced in the 109th Congress
by Senator Akaka as S. 263.
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153
report. PRPA encompassed the recommendations made in the
report,154 which advised that (1) federal action should reaffirm federal
fossils’ scientific, educational, and, when appropriate, recreational
values; (2) vertebrate fossil collection should only be performed by
qualified persons, and fossils should remain the property of the
United States; (3) penalties for fossil theft should be strengthened
and should take into account the fossils’ value and any damage
resulting from illegal collection; and (4) the public should be involved
in federal fossil management, and educational opportunities should
be increased.155
Like the existing laws and VPRPA, PRPA would apply only to
156
federal lands, and fossils that are collected would remain property
of the United States.157 A permit would be required in all cases except
casual collecting158—a new designation covering common invertebrate
159
and plant fossils collected for noncommercial personal use. Casual
collectors would be limited to a “reasonable amount” of fossils that
are collected so as to produce “negligible disturbance” to the earth’s
surface.160 Permits would be issued to qualified applicants excavating
for the purpose of furthering paleontological knowledge or public
education.161
PRPA would impose both criminal and civil penalties.162 In
addition, illegal collectors’ vehicles and equipment could be seized,
163
along with the wrongfully collected fossils, and disposed of or sold.

153. 149 CONG. REC. S3266 (statement of Sen. Akaka).
154. Id.
155. U.S. DEP’T. OF THE INTERIOR ET AL., supra note 50, at 9–10. The report made three
other recommendations: (1) agencies should continue to take mission-specific approaches to
plant and invertebrate fossil management; (2) there should be an increased emphasis on fossil
inventory to ensure effective stewardship; and (3) scientifically valuable fossils should be
curated as federal property and modern technology should be used to improve curation, access,
and information sharing. Id.
156. S. 263 pmbl., 109th Cong. (2005). “Federal lands” means lands controlled or
administered by the Secretary of the Interior, except Indian lands, and National Forest System
lands controlled or administered by the Secretary of Agriculture. Id. § 2(3).
157. Id. § 5(c)(1).
158. Id. § 5(a)(2).
159. Id. § 2(1).
160. Id. “Reasonable amount” and “negligible disturbance” are terms that will be
determined by the secretary who administers the public land on which the particular resource is
found. Id. § 2(2).
161. Id. § 5(b).
162. Id. §§ 7–8.
163. Id. § 9(b).
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As under existing regulations, federal paleontological resources could
164
not be disturbed unless explicitly permitted by PRPA. Furthermore,
if a person knew or should have known that a particular resource had
been obtained illegally, any trade in that resource would be a criminal
offense.165 False labels, records, or accounts of excavated federal
fossils would also be prohibited.166 Transgressors could be imprisoned
167
for up to ten years and fined. However, if the sum of the
commercial and paleontological value of the fossils involved and the
restoration and repair costs did not exceed five hundred dollars, then
the imprisonment would be limited to a maximum of one year.168
Regulations promulgated under the PRPA would specify civil
169
penalties. Penalty payments would be used to protect, restore, or
repair the fossils and sites that were the subject of the action, or to
acquire and protect other sites with equivalent resources.170
PRPA would also include a carrot to aid enforcement: rewards
for information. The rewards would be paid from collected penalties
and would be distributed to anyone who provided information
leading to a civil or criminal penalty.171 The reward would be the
lesser of five hundred dollars or half of the collected penalty.172
PRPA would emphasize public education and awareness of the
significance of paleontological resources.173 Seized fossils would be
transferred to educational institutions and used for scientific or
174
educational purposes. All federal fossils would be managed and
protected using scientific principles and expertise, preserved for the
public, and made available for scientific research and public
education.175 Interagency coordination and collaborative efforts with
nonfederal partners, the scientific community, and the general public
176
would characterize plans to inventory, monitor, and use the fossils.

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. § 7(a)(1).
Id. § 7(a)(2).
Id. § 7(b).
Id. § 7(c).
Id.
Id. § 8(a)(2).
Id. § 8(d).
Id. § 9(a).
Id.
Id. § 4.
Id. § 9(c).
Id. § 5(c)(2).
Id. § 3(a).
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III. AN IDEAL STATUTE
An ideal legal framework for managing fossils should meet two
goals: first, it should maximize the preservation of fossils’ scientific
and cultural value, and second, it should be enforceable. It should
also be able to meet these goals while operating in an imperfect
world. In other words, the ideal legal framework would embrace the
unpleasant realities of paleontological resource protection: only
public land is regulable, agency resources are limited, and people are
greedy. Either comprehensive legislation or a uniform regulatory
framework created by land management agencies can create this
framework.177 National legislation is preferable to uniform agency
regulation because it would establish clear authority, give lawmakers
a clean slate, and refocus national attention on the scientific and
cultural importance of fossils.178
Other countries go farther, limiting commercial collecting on
both public and private land. The United States is “almost alone
among nations in taking an essentially hands-off position as to such
materials on private lands, unless they are human remains.”179 For
example, China prohibits the removal of any Chinese fossils from the
180
country under their Cultural Relics Protection Law, and Australia
heavily regulates the export of Australian fossils under its Protection
of Moveable Cultural Heritage Act of 1986.181 The legal literature
about fossil regulation neglects to address why the United States does
182
not extend its protection to nonfederal fossils, but the strong
American tradition of protecting private property rights suggests one
reason for the limitation.
Although it would be ideal to extend statutory protection to
private lands along with public lands, there are too many legal and
political barriers in this country for this change to be feasible. First,
because extending protection to private lands runs counter to
American private property values it would certainly be opposed in
177. Malmsheimer & Hilfinger, supra note 27, at 613–14.
178. Lundgren, supra note 87, at 259.
179. Sax, supra note 16, at 176.
180. See Schmidt, supra note 17, at 186 (discussing amendments to the Cultural Relics
Protection Law to provide more protection for fossils).
181. Michael Reed, Heritage Slips Out Quietly, AUSTRALIAN, Aug. 13, 1999, at 10.
182. Paleontological resources covered by ARPA are the exception to the generally
unprotected status of nonfederal fossils. See 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(1) (2000) (stating that
paleontological specimens are not considered archaeological resources unless they are found in
an archaeological context).
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Congress and by the press as another instance of the federal
government sticking its head where it does not belong. A collector
like Peter Larson, excavating on a private ranch, does not pose a
threat unless one takes an expansive view of public welfare. Second, if
a bill that extended protection to private lands were enacted, the
federally sponsored removal of fossils from nonfederal lands would
implicate the Takings Clause, thereby raising the possibility that the
fossils’ removal would require compensation by the government.183
Third, extending protection to private lands could deter public
involvement in paleontology. This seems like a perverse argument at
first glance, but people are captivated by the idea of ownership,
however illusory. From a scientific perspective, all fossils should be
kept in the public domain where they can be studied, but from a
social or psychological perspective, people are motivated by private
ownership. The thought of owning a piece of the past is alluring.184
Finally, although fossils are valuable as well as fun and interesting,
they simply cannot command the requisite importance to make their
protection universal in this country. Archaeological artifacts that are
found on private lands are also generally unprotected. Because of
artifacts’ close connection to past human life, it seems more likely
that public support for their protection would occur before support
for protection of fossils unrelated to human life.185
A. Maximizing the Preservation of Scientific and Cultural Value
To maximize the preservation of fossils’ scientific and cultural
value, an ideal statute should achieve at least four goals: explicitly ban
commercial collecting on all federal land, vest permanent ownership
of all fossils found on federal land with the United States, deter

183. In addition, because the Eighth Circuit has interpreted fossils as being part of the earth
and not separable into personalty, Black Hills Inst. of Geological Research v. S.D. Sch. of Mines
& Tech., 12 F.3d 737, 742 (8th Cir. 1993) (Black Hills III), real property law would seem to
apply. But see Lazerwitz, supra note 87, at 632 (“While such a ban in the trade of vertebrate
fossils recovered on private lands may seem obtrusive to private land owners and commercial
collectors, Congress’ authority to regulate an analogous activity relating to endangered species
has been held not to constitute a constitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment.”).
184. See Tatiana Flessas, Sacrificial Stone, 14 LAW & LITERATURE 49, 66 (2002) (“We take
ownership of the past. This act of affirmation . . . [is] needed to claim ancient objects or to
occupy or rebuild ruins. It is a cry of fictional recognition, of desire-driven appropriation, of
power that seeks to overturn the loss of memory in the past.”).
185. See Lazerwitz, supra note 87, at 606 (“Paleontological specimens, however, do not have
the inherent cultural interest which is often associated with the remains and artifacts of human
cultures.”).
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plundering, and maintain accessibility to fossils for amateur
collectors.
1. Banning Commercial Collecting on Federal Land.
Commercial collecting on federal land must remain illegal to preserve
fossils’ cultural and scientific value. Banning commercial collecting on
federal lands would destroy any legitimate economic value that any
fossils found there might have. Although there will always be a
market for illegally collected fossils, preventing the emergence of a
legitimate market would encourage collecting only by those with
scientific and educational motivations. Scientists and educators tend
to use care and documentation when collecting, thus preserving
scientific value, and they usually deposit their finds in a public
institution, thus preserving cultural value.186 Commercial collection
compromises both scientific and cultural value in favor of maximizing
187
economic value via private sales and ownership.
2. Vesting Federal Ownership. Any fossils collected on federal
land should remain property of the United States. As noted by the
Eighth Circuit, fossils are ingredients of the land, and although
separated from it, still belong to the landowners.188 Although some
agencies allow private benefit from public resources—selling mineral
189
and timber rights to private companies, for example — such rights
should not be extended to paleontological collection because of
fossils’ significant cultural and scientific value.
The ideal statute would, like PRPA, ensure federal fossil
ownership but grant public access so that fossils remain available for
study and display by requiring that significant finds be kept in a
190
suitable repository. Assigning fossils to the public domain would
avoid the expense of culling scientifically unique specimens from the
rest as the FPA had proposed; FPA’s Council review process would
have used public time and resources for private gain. In addition, a

186. See Lundgren, supra note 87, at 261.
187. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
188. Black Hills III, 12 F.3d at 742.
189. See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., SOLID MINERAL PROGRAMS ON THE
NATION’S FEDERAL LAND: MINIMIZING THE HUMAN ‘FOOTPRINT’ ON THE LANDSCAPE, at
http://www.blm.gov/nhp/pubs/brochures/minerals/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (summarizing Bureau of Land Management regulations regarding mineral
extraction).
190. See supra notes 155–60.
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mandatory federal ownership rule is straightforward and easy to
understand, preventing it from being found unconstitutionally vague,
191
as was the Antiquities Act.
3. Deterring Plundering. A bill banning commercial collecting
on federal land must contain stronger criminal penalties than those
192
currently available under either the Antiquities Act or the theft of
193
government property catch-all provision. In this context, it is more
important to deter plundering than to find and punish violators.
Fines, although punitive in nature, may not act as deterrents because
the potential market price of a good specimen is so high and the
barriers to collection so low. Criminal sanctions must be included in
any ideal legislation, and sentences must be high enough to capture
collectors’ attention and induce them to ensure that they are not
excavating on federal land. The criminal penalties that the PRPA
would provide194—and that would have been provided by VPRPA—
include maximum felony prison sentences of ten years.195 Such
penalties would adequately deter potential federal-land fossil
plunderers at any stage, from excavation to false documentation, and
should be incorporated into the ideal statute. Any legislation should
also include escalating punishments for recidivists, such as those
contained in the VPRPA.196
4. Maintaining Accessibility for Amateurs. An ideal statute
should preserve the role of amateurs, an approach that is favored by
PRPA and that was a driving force behind the FPA. Amateur
collectors play an important role in paleontological discovery and to
some extent, the field depends on keeping amateurs involved.197 The
public should feel that fossils are accessible at every stage, and letting
191. See United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113, 115 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that the
Antiquities Act’s “use of undefined terms of uncommon usage” rendered it “fatally vague”).
192. The punishment for violating the Antiquities Act is a maximum fine of five hundred
dollars or imprisonment of a maximum of ninety days, or both. 16 U.S.C. § 433 (2000).
193. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
194. S. 546, 108th Cong. §9 (2003).
195. Id. Minor violations are not felonies. See 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2000) (“[I]f the value of [the
stolen] property does not exceed the sum of $1,000, he shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both.”).
196. See supra note 136.
197. See U.S. DEP’T. OF THE INTERIOR ET AL., supra note 50, at 34–36 (advocating an
emphasis on public education and the use of technology to foster the involvement of the general
public).
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amateurs help scientists excavate important specimens and bring
home common invertebrate and plant fossils accomplishes this goal.
The BLM’s current guidelines, permitting the collection of reasonable
amounts of common invertebrate fossils and fossil plants for
198
noncommercial purposes, are a good model. The statute, however,
should only allow surface collection. Removing overburden could
unnecessarily expose fossils to the elements, hastening erosion and
accelerating destruction from a matter of years to a matter of weeks.199
There should be a voluntary reporting mechanism through which
amateurs could report any potentially valuable specimens to the
appropriate land use agency. Bone fragments that are washing out of
the matrix and that are visible on the surface may be a sign that a
more intact specimen lies beneath the surface. Although nonpermit
holders should not be allowed to collect vertebrate fossils, not even
bone fragments, alerting agencies of fossil whereabouts may help
manage the resource more effectively. Some collectors who are
considered amateurs, like Sue Hendrickson, are experienced
prospectors, and a reporting mechanism would take advantage of
their advanced skill levels, allowing agencies to cast a wider
reconnaissance net. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this already
happens on some scale—amateurs who know whom to contact will
sometimes call the BLM agent covering the area or forward
photographs of a mysterious bone to the state paleontologist.
Establishing a more effective system that will leave fewer people
wondering what to do with the potential dinosaur graveyard at their
feet will be good for preservation and education. Not all amateur
collectors are out to make a buck; some people simply enjoy the
adventure.
B. Enforceability
An ideal statute would be more enforceable than the current
regime because violations are hard to prosecute, little interpretive
case law exists, and the heart of the problem is not addressed. Three
elements of an enforceable fossil protection statute are clear
guidelines, streamlined processing, and rewards. The Black Hills
litigation is a perfect illustration of why an ideal fossil management
198. Id. at 20 tbl.1.
199. See LEIGGI & MAY, supra note 15, at 71–72 (describing the need for amateurs to obtain
permission from landowners and instructing on appropriate methods for removing sediment
overburden).
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statute must be enforceable. Peter Larson was not charged with any
200
crimes relating to the excavation of Sue even though the excavation
was the clear catalyst for bringing criminal and civil actions against
him. Instead, he was charged with many small crimes, which
ultimately resulted in modest fines and imprisonment.201 Before the
criminal trial even began, there were over 350 entries on the docket
202
sheets in related civil proceedings. The government’s trouble began
when it tried to use the weak, and possibly unconstitutionally vague,
Antiquities Act to prosecute Larson. A stronger federal statute would
have given the government more firepower and would have
streamlined the process. In fact, a stronger statute might have avoided
the incident altogether. Larson, knowing of the possible penalties,
might have decided to examine more diligently whether he could dig
on Williams’ land. Someone of Larson’s experience would have been
aware of Sue’s economic value as private property, and such an
individual probably would have double checked the property to be
sure that Sue would not be confiscated and that there would not be
criminal penalties for excavating her.
1. Clear Guidelines. The statute must clearly list the permitted
and forbidden activities and detail the available punishments. In
addition, it must provide guidelines for prosecution. The statute
should also apply to all federal lands in the same way, regardless of
which government agency manages the land. Under the current
regulatory regime, each agency has its own rules, meaning that
collectors—both commercial and noncommercial—and prosecutors
have five different sets of rules to learn. Although surface collecting is
legal on BLM land, it is not legal on National Park land.203 This
understandably confuses amateurs204 and may create an escape chute
for informed commercial collectors. Employing a uniform rule would
eliminate such misunderstandings, requiring everybody to remember
and follow the same rules on all federal lands. The ideal statute
should also streamline prosecution efforts because cases would follow
similar formats, deepening interpretive case law.
200. See supra notes 73–79 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text.
202. In re Larson, 43 F.3d 410, 411 (8th Cir. 1994) (Black Hills IV).
203. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR ET AL., supra note 50, at 20.
204. See id. at 28 (“The consulting agencies received some input to indicate that the
differences in collection policies for plant and invertebrate fossils may be confusing to the
public.”).
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2. Streamlined Processing. The statute should not impose new
rules that generate more paperwork for agencies to complete. All
three of the proposed bills include provisions that would increase
mandatory reporting, permitting, and levels of evaluation by federal
land agents; some scholarly publications support this position as
well.205 Government agencies have limited resources, and these
resources should be put to their best and highest use. In this case, that
use is protecting fossils and preventing plundering. A more elaborate
permitting and reporting system should not be a part of an ideal
statute because more permits require more agents to review them,
leaving less time for field work. Requiring amateurs to obtain permits
for casual surface collection would be impractical because of the
permit volume and the impossibility of enforcement. If lawmakers
must increase the amount of red tape in this area, they should support
this decision by sufficiently funding the agencies responsible for
reviewing the paperwork. One commentator suggests dispensing
updated information about fossils through a permit system206—an
excellent suggestion that could be incorporated in a non-permit
context. For example, kiosks in popular collecting areas could include
this information, as could government web sites.
3. Rewards. Rewards in exchange for information about
violators may aid enforcement. PRPA includes reward provisions,
although the Forest Service believes that the maximum reward
amount would be ineffective in most cases and that an appropriate
reward amount should be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking
into account the significance of the case and the provided
information.207 Such a reward system would differ from the voluntary
reporting mechanism suggested above208 because it would apply only
to reports of suspected illegal collection, and not to sightings of
undisturbed fossil sites.

205. See, e.g., Lazerwitz, supra note 87, at 634–35 (approving VPRPA’s additional reporting
requirements, but suggesting that permitting and management authority be centralized within
one federal agency); Lundgren, supra note 87, at 260 (“One possible way to provide additional
protection to fossils is to require amateurs to receive permits to collect fossils on public lands.”).
206. Lundgren, supra note 87, at 261.
207. Estill Testimony, supra note 51.
208. See supra Part III.A.4.
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Some countries also offer “finders rewards” to discoverers of
209
antiquities as an incentive to turn them over to the State. Professor
Sax states that “practical wisdom suggests that finders ordinarily need
to be compensated generously or the public is unlikely to get the
found objects, regardless of the formal rules.”210 As the Forest Service
warned, however, it is unlikely that the United States would be able
211
to fund adequate finders rewards; a voluntary reporting mechanism
that depends on citizens’ virtue may be the best available substitute.
A survey conducted in 1995 showed that over 90 percent of
respondents believed that a fossil should be reported to authorities,
regardless of whether it was found on private or federal land.212 This
suggests that voluntary reporting could be successful.
CONCLUSION
The primary goal of this Note is to illustrate how valuable fossils
are to society’s collective understanding of Earth’s past and future,
and that this value transcends dollar signs. Scientific and cultural
value must take precedence over economic enrichment, and
lawmakers must be pushed to pass legislation that will protect these
resources for all people, not just those fortunate enough to afford
them or tenacious enough to dig them up and take them home. This
Note encourages participation in paleontology at all levels, but urges
responsible collection, documentation, and storage. This can best be
achieved through the passage of comprehensive legislation that bans
commercial collecting on federal land, provides that all fossils found
on federal land remain the property of the people, deters plundering,
ensures access to fossils for amateur collectors, establishes clear
guidelines, promotes streamlined processing, and rewards those who
provide information about violators. Without a significant paradigm
shift in the way Americans think about personal property,
comprehensive legislation will not reach fossils found on private
property, which are equally deserving of protection. Nevertheless,
new legislation may ensure that tomorrow’s enthusiasts can enjoy the
209. SAX, supra note 15, at 185. Two countries offering “finders rewards” are Iraq and
Sudan. Id.
210. Id.
211. See Forster Testimony, supra note 14, at 44 (statement of Elizabeth Estill, Deputy
Chief, Programs, Legislation, and Communications, U.S. Forest Service) (“However, the
currently worded language in Section 11 provides a maximum reward amount that we believe
would [be] ineffective in most cases.”).
212. Lundgren, supra note 87, at 238.
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fossils that today’s collectors leave for them on federal lands. This is
an opportunity to shape the future, not merely to reconstruct the past.

